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ABSTRACT In recent years, many researchers have focused on developing a feasible solution for storing 
and exchanging medical images in the field of health care. Current practices are deployed on cloud-based 
centralized data centers, which increase maintenance costs, require massive storage space, and raise privacy 
concerns about sharing information over a network. Therefore, it is important to design a framework to 
enable sharing and storing of big medical data efficiently within a trustless environment. In the present 
paper, we propose a novel proof-of-concept design for a distributed patient-centric image management 
(PCIM) system that is aimed to ensure safety and control of patient private data without using a centralized 
infrastructure. In this system, we employed an emerging Ethereum blockchain and a distributed file system 
technology called Inter-Planetary File System (IPFS). Then, we implemented an Ethereum smart contract 
called the patient-centric access control protocol to enable a distributed and trustworthy access control 
policy. IPFS provides the means for decentralized storage of medical images with global accessibility. The 
PCIM system ensures a high level of data security by applying asymmetric cryptographic technique. We 
describe how the PCIM system architecture facilitates the distributed and secured patient-centric data 
access across multiple entities such as hospitals, patients, and image requestors. Finally, we conducted 
experiments to test the proposed framework within the Windows environment and deployed a smart 
contract prototype on an Ethereum testnet blockchain. The experimental results demonstrated that the 
proposed scheme is feasible. 
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, distributed storage, medical image sharing, smart contract, distributed image 
management, IPFS, cryptography. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Transition to electronic management of health records has 
necessitated practitioners and their patients to make use of 
several new acronyms such as electronic medical records 
(EMRs), electronic health records (EHRs), and personal 
health records (PHRs) [1]. These health records usually 
contain medical images and patient information, such as 
physician name, personal statistics (e.g., age and weight), 
home monitoring device data, and other data processed by 
practitioners in a text format. Medical images and patient 
information are stored and maintained by different hospitals, 
even when being related to the same patient. Current 
technologies for transferring medical images and patient 
information are deployed on centralized data centers that are 
deemed inappropriate due to privacy, accessibility, storage, 
and security concerns. Over recent decades, medical record 
data breaches within large medical data centers create 
additional difficulties for all companies seeking to develop 
medical image processing applications [2].  
Recently, the blockchain technology, e.g., Bitcoin [3] and 
Ethereum [4], has become one of the most important research 
topics, not only in the finance industry but broadly across the 
field of information technologies due to its decentralized 
nature. Healthcare-based blockchain applications have been 
gaining particular attention in terms of applying them to 
enable interoperable sharing the real-time data among 
providers, payers, and patients [5], [6].  
Public blockchain technology is an open distributed ledger 
that stores all transaction details in blocks [3]. A typical 
blockchain consists of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) 
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structure, where each block is linked with the previous block 
by a hash. Information stored in each block is public and 
cannot be easily deleted nor modified. Therefore, a 
blockchain is considered to be a decentralized method to 
facilitate verifiable exchanges of transactions between any 
two entities efficiently and permanently. Timely verification 
and recording of transactions are possible without the 
necessity in a centralized intermediary. A blockchain has 
such advantages as being tamper-proof and capable of 
protecting information against integrity-based attacks.  
A significant problem with regard to storing medical 
images and records in a blockchain is the size of the 
content. For example, as of October 2019, the size of the 
Bitcoin blockchain reached 286.23 GB1. This is the result 
of data accumulation over the past ten years at a growth rate 
of 1 MB every 10 minutes since Bitcoin was launched in 
2009. There are approximately 1000 transactions in a block. 
Thereby, a single transaction has the order of 1 KB. The 
size of medical images corresponds to the orders of 
magnitude larger than those a public blockchain can offer 
[7]. To solve the problem of decentralized storage, the 
Protocol Labs [8] created a distributed web called Inter 
Planetary File System (IPFS). IPFS was designed to enable a 
content-addressable, peer-to-peer (P2P) technology to share 
and store hypermedia in a distributed file system. Several 
other decentralized storage systems were developed, such as 
storj, swarm, and sia [9]. IPFS has an advantage of being 
compatible with other blockchain networks by offering an 
off-chain storage solution. IPFS provides permanent, smarter, 
and faster web services to distributed data access systems.  
However, several obstacles exist in terms of storing 
sensitive medical images over these distributed storage 
solutions, such as unauthorized access and privacy concerns 
with regard to patient images. Namely, the ability to manage 
big data across general practitioners, hospitals, patients, and 
medical institutes without significant exposure to the risk of 
privacy breaches is essential. Another important aspect of a 
confidential and secure storage system is the ability to reduce 
the cost and restrictions of medical image acquisition by 
eliminating the need in centralized parties [10].  
Therefore, the following research question is formulated: 
“How can we design a patient-centric distributed 
architecture for the purpose of medical image storage and 
sharing, while simultaneously addressing the concerns about 
privacy, security, access flexibility, and costs?” 
To answer this question, we propose a proof-of-concept 
(POC) design for a distributed framework called a patient-
centric image management (PCIM) system that is a 
blockchain-based architecture designed to facilitate secured 
patient-centric access and storage of encrypted medical 
images within an open distributed network.  
The contributions of this paper are as follows: 
                                                 
1 [online]. Available: https://bitinfocharts.com/bitcoin/ 
(1) We provide a brief overview on the structure of the 
proposed PCIM system and illustrate interactions among 
different components of the system.  
(2) We propose a patient-centric access control protocol 
using a smart contract (PCAC-SC). Specific functions are 
considered to transmit information in and out of the 
Ethereum blockchain and give access privileges between 
entities. 
(3) We implement a framework to test feasibility of the 
concept. To this end, we have developed a PCAC-SC 
prototype on an Ethereum test network. We have published 
the related source codes online. 
(4) We verify the functionality using test cases and 
analyzed the capabilities of the proposed framework. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 
II, we discuss the state of medical image sharing. The 
system components of the proposed framework are 
described in Section III. An overview of the proposed 
PCIM system and PCAC-SC is presented in Section IV. 
Implementation and verification of the proposed system are 
described in Section V.  Finally, Section VI and Section VII 
discusses the limitations, future research directions and 
concludes the work. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
The practice of medical health record registering and sharing 
has changed considerably in the past 20 years, largely 
because of strict practice standards, the use of complex 
technologies, and accurate diagnosis and treatment. Medical 
images are typically shared on CDs or DVDs shipped 
between hospitals, physicians, and patients to conclude on 
diagnosis, however, applying this technology might lead to 
damage or interception of medical images resulting from 
patient or physician errors [11]. To overcome the 
shortcomings of physical media transfer, an internet-based 
standard communication technology called digital imaging 
and communications in medicine (DICOM) [12] was 
introduced to share, and store medical images across various 
healthcare enterprises. The two main components of DICOM 
standard are a DICOM file format and a network 
communication protocol which uses TCP/IP to communicate 
between systems. A DICOM file format consists of header 
tags and image data sets embedded into a single file which is 
unqualifiedly editable. Thus, the DICOM standard does not 
provide transmission security nor data protection [13]. The 
electronic transmission of DICOM medical images was 
developed by the Radiological Society of North America 
(RSNA) based on the image-sharing network (ISN) [14]. 
However, the ISN architecture employs picture archiving and 
communication systems (PACS) based centralized image 
storage, where images from multiple imaging modalities [15] 
are indexed by a cryptographic hash and managed by a third-
party clearing house. 
   The researchers [16] found that default accounts, cross-site 
scripting, and vulnerabilities in the web server could lead to 
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breaches in PACS access and permanent modifications of 
medical images. The existing infrastructure design raises 
concerns regarding the use of third-parties and a centralized 
network. 
   Recently, several researchers focused on developing a 
framework that combine a cloud service and a blockchain for 
the purpose of medical health record sharing. The authors in 
[17] presented a specialized blockchain-based system for 
dermatology. Patients can access encrypted images and 
selectively share medical records using a private digital key. 
The authors discussed the possibility of allowing machine 
learning algorithms to access various images stored on the 
blockchain network to drive the optimization of computer-
assisted analysis, but the scalability and cost effectiveness 
issue must be considered before standardizing this technique.  
In [18], the authors designed a breadcrumb mechanism for a 
medical record search known as MedBlock. Breadcrumbs 
were aimed to record addresses of blocks containing the 
patient-related data. Unfortunately, these solutions are not 
applicable to the process of searching the data over the 
blockchain due to an increase in the fragmented data. The 
authors in [19] proposed MedShare, a hybrid cloud-based 
sharing solution for EHRs that is based on a centralized cloud 
server provider. Then, this external server was replaced by 
two decentralized networks called MedChain [20]. In the 
concept of MedChain, the authors proposed a session-based 
data sharing scheme and a digest chain structure 
implemented using an immutable blockchain and the mutable 
P2P storage architecture. However, the possibilities of 
tampering and manipulating stored patient health records are 
at high risk due to the mutable P2P storage architecture. In 
[21], a blockchain-based cross-domain image-sharing 
framework was proposed. However, no attempt to address 
privacy concerns has taken to facilitate sharing images 
through a blockchain. 
 
III. SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
In this section, we present the description of main 
components represented in the proposed PCIM system. 
A. ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN 
Ethereum [7, 28] was developed based on the Bitcoin system 
and incorporated a programmable smart contract (SC) 
platform. In other words, SC is a computer program that 
stores rules for negotiating the terms of a contract. Programs 
can autonomously verify and execute contract-related 
agreements, thereby, reducing the cost of constructing and 
managing a centralized database. SC employs the Ethereum 
virtual machine that allows users to run SC within the 
blockchain network. In general, the fee mechanism of the 
Ethereum system depends on the value of gas [4]. A certain 
amount of gas is required to execute a SC and perform a 
transaction. A digital currency can be used to purchase gas. 
The actual transaction cost is defined as follows: 
Ether  gas used  gas price.   
  The Ethereum platform consists of two types of accounts: 
external owned accounts (EOAs) controlled by private keys 
and contract ones controlled by the contract code. EOAs are 
used to execute a transaction sending ether or to trigger 
execution of SC. An Ethereum transaction includes 
parameters such as recipient address, gas price, gas limit, 
ether values, account nonce, sender signature, and endpoint 
of the medical image. The Ethereum blockchain has an 
associated state database based on a Merkle-Patricia tree 
structure similar to IPFS objects. Therefore, we can model a 
blockchain using IPFS for more secure off-chain and on-
chain storage of medical images. In the proposed scheme, we 
implemented the PCAC-SC protocol using an Ethereum 
blockchain to enable transparent controlled access, so that 
malicious entities could not access the medical images 
without patient authorization. 
B. IPFS STORAGE 
IPFS is a content-based peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol in which 
each medical image file is assigned with a unique fingerprint 
denoted as a cryptographic hash. Addressing the hash is 
applied to make the contents immutable [8]. The IPFS file 
storage structure consists of a Merkle DAG that combines 
Merkle trees with a DAG. The key feature of IPFS in terms 
of the proposed system is to access medical images through 
the content addressing approach, rather than location-based 
addressing one. Therefore, IPFS allows reducing the 
bandwidth cost, increasing the image download speed, and 
distributing a large volume of data with no duplication, in 
which allows achieving storage savings. The data structure 
for storing a file is an IPFS object, which consists of data and 
links. A single IPFS object can store up to 256 Kb of the 
unstructured binary data. If a file is larger than 256 Kb, it is 
split into and stored as multiple IPFS objects with an empty 
object containing links to all other objects of the image. 
Therefore, IPFS is an immutable storage mechanism; 
modifying a file will change the hash value. To update a file, 
IPFS uses a version control system called Git2, which creates 
a commit object, when a file is added to the IPFS network; 
this approach allows tracking all file versions. When an 
update is made to a file, a new commit object is created as a 
link to a new object to interconnect with an older commit 
object version of that file.  
C. SECURING MEDICAL IMAGES 
We encrypt the sensitive medical images before uploading 
to the global IPFS network in order to prevent unauthorized 
access. The participants can view the sensitive medical 
images securely by swapping encryption keys. This ensures 
data originality, ensures data security, and prevents data 
from being leaked to irrelevant users and being subject to 
malicious attacks such as eavesdropping, phishing, and 
                                                 
 
2 [Online]. Available: https://www.git-scm.com/ 
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brute force attacks [23]. 
   The medical image is encrypted using the OpenPGP 
(Pretty Good Privacy) protocol [24]. OpenPGP is a specific 
implementation of asymmetric encryption that is used to 
define standard formats for encrypted messages, signatures, 
and certificates with the purpose of exchanging public keys. 
Therefore, a pair of asymmetric keys, a public and private 
one, is generated. The public key is shared openly without 
compromising the security, while the private key must be 
kept private. It is owned by the patient secretly and is used 
to decrypt the image. The advantage of applying this 
encryption technique is that using the private key, a digital 
signature of an image is created to verify its authenticity in 
the event of a malicious attack. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE PCIM SYSTEM 
In the proposed PCIM system, medical images are not stored 
in the blockchain to avoid scaling to the unmanageable size 
and thereby, a resulting blockchain bloat. Therefore, in the 
present study, we utilized the Ethereum blockchain for the 
proposed POC framework to efficiently manage the identity 
database and access control across participants. This action 
allows reducing the fees associated with storing images and 
managing the related database state. The fundamental 
purpose of this system is to provide distributed immutable 
on-chain and off-chain storage to facilitate patient-centric 
management for complex health record data. Figure 1 
illustrates the blockchain ledger data structure with a PCIM 
data field added, as it is designed to store the data that 
patients want to include in a transaction. 
   In the proposed scheme, the PCIM data field contents 
include such information as an image hash value (endpoint 
of an encrypted medical image), patient addresses, 
timestamp, encryption public key, image description, and a 
block hash to form an unchangeable record, as each block is 
linked with the hash of its previous blocks to connect and 
verify transactions. Every block is updated in the ledger 
after transactions are approved and recorded by a patient in 
the network. A transaction consists of a part corresponding 
to the ledger content signed and sent by a patient to execute 
SC by paying ether. Then, transaction validation is 
performed by the selected and approved consortium. As the 
blockchain is implemented in the healthcare ecosystem, 
participants seek to achieve decentralizing the process of 
medical data management. 
   The overall architecture of the PCIM system framework 
is illustrated in Figure 2. As it can be seen, it consists of 
Ethereum and IPFS networks. The Ethereum network is 
comprised of PCAC-SC and of a blockchain ledger to 
manage identity and access control within the network. The 
resulting encrypted medical images are stored in the IPFS 
network. We discuss the participant interactions with 
system module in the following subsections (See Figure.3). 
A. SYSTEM MODEL 
The participants of the proposed PCIM system are defined 
below: 
Patient: Patients are the owners of their medical images. 
A patient is required to create PCAC-SC and store this SC 
in the Ethereum blockchain. The patient is responsible for 
defining the access right to the images in the IPFS network. 
This definition is done within his/her own PCAC-SC.  
    Radiologist: A radiologist is able to generate medical 
images for a patient. The prime responsibility of the 
FIGURE 1. Blockchain ledger data structure. 
FIGURE 2. Architecture of patient-centric image management (PCIM) system. The architecture component split into two main decentralized 
modules: IPFS and Ethereum network. 
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radiologist is to upload the patient encrypted medical 
images to the IPFS network and to verify the patient initial 
transaction on blockchain. 
Image Requestors (IRs): Doctors, medical institutes, 
research groups, insurance companies, and general 
practitioners interested in accessing patient medical images 
are all considered as image requestors IRs. The patient can 
grant access privileges to any IRs based on the 
authorization policy defined in PCAC-SC. 
B. ETHEREUM NETWORK: PCAC-SC PROTOCOL 
We use the Ethereum SC to enforce access control policy 
on patient medical image on-chain contents. The SC stored 
in the Ethereum blockchain designed to contain unique 
image id, permissions, metadata and image integrity of the 
individual patient. The PCAC-SC protocol uses special 
functions to provide information about the blockchain and 
image access privileges for IRs. Furthermore, protocol 
helps in tracking all the on-chain activities of all 
participants. The functions of SC are triggered by a patient 
and IRs entity using their own Ethereum addresses. Thus, 
transaction costs reduced by using embedded protocols to 
reduce administrative burdens and remove intermediaries. 
All triggered functions are stored within the blockchain 
ledger as events to allow the entity keeping track of the 
transaction details. This enables transparency in the 
triggered functions and maintains the anonymity of patients 
by displaying only events stored in the blockchain. In this 
framework, we used a single variable and the following 
functions: 
msg.sender: the address variable of the owner who 
interacts with SC. 
create_contract(): this function is created and 
executed only by a patient to issue corresponding roles for 
IRs and related information for accessing medical images. 
This function takes as input a patient’s encrypted medical 
image hash value ( )ph I ,  
blockchain address P , image description P  and the 
timestamp when the function was executed by SC. 
requesting_access(): this function is executed by 
IRs to obtain access permission from the patient. IRs 
includes as input the patient blockchain address P  and 
IRs public key IRK

 to encrypt medical images and 
additional information, such as usage notes. 
approve_IRs(): this function can only be executed by 
the patient. It grants/denies access permission by using as 
input the IRs blockchain address IR  IRs public key IRK

, 
and notes from IRs. The input notes contain relevant 
information such as the expiration date and message for 
requestors. 
    trace_authorization():this function executed by 
IRs and patients to track the history of approved or 
disapproved requestors in the blockchain. Thus, participant 
authenticity to access patient medical images verified by 
calling this function. 
remove_IRs(): this function takes the approved IRs 
blockchain address 
IR  as input and removes IRs from SC 
upon successful execution of a function by the patient. 
Consequently, SC is updated. Therefore, the removed IRs 
has no privilege to access the medical image contents stored 
on-chain. Note that, this function used to record the log of 
removed entity in the blockchain as a proof. Thus, the 
participants are legally not allowed to access the medical 
images. 
 
Algorithm 1: create_contract() 
    Input: ( )ph I ,
P  , P  
    Output: bool 
1: if msg.sender is not 
P  then 
2: throw; 
3: end 
4: mapping ( )ph I to (
P ) and add it to ledger 
5: return true; 
 
Algorithm 2: requesting_access() 
  Input:
P  , IRK

, Notes  
  Output: bool 
1: if msg.sender is not IR  then 
2: throw; 
3: end 
4: call PCAC-SC (); 
5: if new_IRs_address ⇐ approved then 
6: return true; 
7: else 
8: if new_IRs_address ⇐ not approved then 
9: return false; 
10: end 
 
Algorithm 3: approve_IRs() 
   Input: IR , Notes 
   Output: bool 
1: if msg.sender is not P  then 
2: throw; 
3: end 
4: if IR  exist then 
5: return false; 
6: else 
7: authorize_User[ IR ] ⇐ true; 
8: mapping ( )ph I to ( IR ), and add it to ledger 
9: return true; 
10: end 
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Algorithm 4: trace_authorization()  
   Input: 
P , IR  
   Output: bool 
1: if msg.sender is not 
IR  then 
2: throw; 
3: end 
4: if 
IR exist then 
5: return true; 
6: else 
7: return false; 
8: end 
 
Algorithm 5: remove_IRs 
   Input: IR  
   Output: bool 
1: if msg.sender is not 
P  then 
2: throw; 
3: end 
4: if 
IR  is not exist then 
5: return false; 
6: else 
7: authorize_User[ IR ] ⇐ false; 
8: return true; 
9: end 
C. IPFS NETWORK 
IPFS is used to store encrypted medical images that contain 
the encrypted patient information in an open distributed 
storage system, in which images can be exchanged using a 
hash string path. The paths work similarly to the traditional 
uniform resource locator used in the web. Therefore, all 
patient images are always accessible through their hash.  
   The radiologist uploads medical images of the patient to 
the system and uses a patient public key to encrypt the 
images: thereafter, only the patient can decrypt them. 
Medical image contents are signed by Ethereum private 
keys of the patient and then, are stored in the blockchain. 
Therefore, other entities can check the authenticity and 
integrity of the image ownership using the content hash and 
digital signature in the blockchain. In IPFS, files can be 
accessed even if the host node is offline, as they are located 
in multiple locations for redundancy. SC enforces access 
control only to the on-chain content stored on blockchain. It 
controls access to the medical image in the IPFS network in 
terms of image file attributes, that help in tracking all the 
on-chain activities of participants. Moreover, The PCIM 
system protects the off-chain patient data using the security 
and privacy feature. Therefore, combining IPFS and the 
blockchain allows building a permanently addressable on-
chain and off-chain data storage that can be linked securely 
to other significant systems or databases in the world, 
thereby, forming a global healthcare network. 
D. SYSTEM INTERACTION 
Figure. 3 illustrates the process of how a patient and a 
radiologist interact between each other in the part of the 
proposed PCIM system, where medical image storage and 
sharing are performed. First, the patient undergoes the 
medical image examination performed by the radiologist. A 
medical image 
PI  of the patient is produced. The patient 
seeks to have it protected and to maintain the ownership of 
this image. Consequently, to address this issue, the 
radiologist encrypts the initial medical image and obtains 
encrypted image. Thereafter, the radiologist obtains the 
hash of the encrypted image ( )ph I from the IPFS network 
and provides the patient with ( )ph I  for the reference 
purpose. ( )ph I  is stored in the blockchain, while the 
encrypted medical image PI  is stored in IPFS. Owing to 
the fact that the image was encrypted, the patient medical 
image
PI is accessible only to those who have the 
decryption key and thereby, it is protected from 
unauthorized access. 
 
   As presented in Figure.3, the exact protocol for this 
interaction is explained in detail as follows: 
1) Offline interaction between the patient and the 
radiologist 
 a) The patient requests the radiologist to store his/her 
medical image. 
b) The radiologist asks the patient to provide its encryption 
key. 
c) The patient generates a pair of encryption keys: 
public PK

and private PK

. 
d) The patient sends to the radiologist PK

 through a secure 
communication medium for creating image authentication 
and encrypt the original medical image. 
e) PK

is protected and kept safe by the patient.  
2) The radiologist encrypts with PK

 while concealing the 
patient private information on a medical image. Encrypted 
image PI  is uploaded to the IPFS network, which returns a 
hash ( )ph I to the radiologist.  
3) The radiologist shares ( )ph I through a secure 
communication medium with the patient. 
4) The patient creates a contract using the PCAC-SC 
protocol and executes it. 
5) The created contract function signs a transaction on 
the Ethereum blockchain along with patient public key 
FIGURE 3. Interaction model of the PCIM system. 
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( P
 ), ( )ph I , time, image description (
P ) such as 
patient blockchain address (
P ), and an imaging 
modality from which the data are obtained (e.g., CT, 
US, MRI, etc). This transaction is verified by the 
radiologist and included in the blockchain. This verification 
process prevents multiple entities from executing 
create_contract() function on the same image hash. 
6) The patient owns the medical images within the PCIM 
system. The patient can access, audit, prove the ownership, 
and authorize any other IRs (e.g., doctors, medical 
institutes, research groups and general practitioners) to use 
their medical images based on PCAC-SC. We discuss the 
PCAC-SC interaction sequence in Section V-B. 
In summary, a blockchain transaction consists of the 
following contents signed by a patient to represent the 
ownership of the transaction contents: 
1{ , ( ), }
P
pP Ph I    
where the part given inside the parenthesis, { }, is the 
content signed under the Ethereum blockchain private key 
1
P
 of the patient. 
E. MEDICAL IMAGE SHARING 
Medical image sharing between a patient and an image 
requestor is based on PCAC-SC protocol. For example, 
consider a new image requestor interested in accessing the 
patient medical images for research purposes.   
   The protocol for gaining an access based on PCIM system 
is as follows: 
1) Requestor shares IRK

 a public key using 
requesting_access() a SC function.  
2) Patient downloads the encrypted image from the IPFS 
network using the IPFS hash value. 
3) Patient decrypts the encrypted image with patient’s own 
private key PK

. 
4) Patient obtains the requestor’s public key by providing 
the requestor’s blockchain address. 
5) Patient encrypts the original image with the requestor’s  
public key IRK

and uploads the encrypted image to the IPFS 
network. 
6) Patient signs a transaction on the blockchain along with 
the requestor’s public key, the patient’s public key and the 
IPFS hash value using approve_IRs()function. 
7) The image requestor is able to retrieve the medical image 
using the IPFS hash value and decrypts with his/her own 
private key IRK

. In this way, medical images are shared 
between the patient and the requester.  
   In this protocol, the encryption and the decryption of 
original medical images are performed on the IPFS network 
by the patient. In our future work, the complexity 
underlying this action will be improved with a user friendly 
application interface for emergency access. 
 
 
 
 
V. EVALUATION 
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
A POC design of the PCIM system was developed to test 
and evaluate its performance. The experiment was 
conducted using a Windows 10 desktop with an Intel® 
Core ™ i5-6600 processor at 3.30 GHz. PCAC-SC was 
implemented in the remix IDE
3
 using Solidity
4
 
programming language. We deployed the program within 
the private Rinkeby test network using MetaMask
5
. This 
test network allows us to verify and optimize the prototype 
before implementing in a public blockchain. We initialized 
IPFS using go-ipfs
6
 and uploaded an encrypted medical 
image to the IPFS network from a local computer. This 
operation returned a unique hash value linked to the 
uploaded medical image. Thereafter, we updated 
transactions on the blockchain using 
create_contract()function by defining the IPFS hash, 
patient Ethereum public key, and the basic medical image 
description. Once the block was approved, transactions 
were stored in the blockchain.  
The complete prototype code of PCAC-SC is published 
in our GitHub repository
7
. The contract deployed on the 
test network has the following address: 
 
0x5575805E19b4807974Be0B77Fd9d385D4A0e6d1E 
 
Transactions on each function can be seen using the above 
address at the Rinkeby Etherscan website
8
. 
   Figure 4 illustrates such parameters as the block/timeline, 
functions, and event sequence defined in the PCAC-SC 
protocol for granting and revoking permissions between a 
patient and image requestor IRs entities. To allow for better 
understanding of this access sharing sequence, we consider 
an example of two IRs: a doctor (
1IR ) and a general 
practitioner    (
2IR ) who is interested in accessing a patient 
medical image. The patient executes 
create_contract() function by  signing the blockchain 
contents (see Section IV-D). This function allows 1IR and 
2IR  to participate by calling the request function in the 
PCAC-SC protocol defined by the patient. Each of the 
entities has its own Ethereum address to perform the 
operations.  
 
 
    
                                                 
3 [Online]. Available: https://remix.ethereum.org/ 
4  [Online]. Available: https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/units-and-
global-variables.html 
5 [Online]. Available: https://metamask.io/ 
6 [Online]. Available: https://github.com/ipfs/go-ipfs 
7 [Online]. Available: https://github.com/infonetGIST/PCAC-SC 
8 [Online]. Available: https://rinkeby.etherscan.io/ 
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In Figure 4, blocks from 2 to 7 illustrate the access 
privilege scenario. 
1IR and 2IR  send a request to access 
medical images using request_access()function that is 
represented by block 2 and block 3. Block 4 and block 5 
show that the patient is able to grant and deny the access by 
using the approve_IRs() function. In Figure. 4, block 6 
depicts an event that 
1IR  authorized to access image, since 
in the block 4 
1IR   image request accepted by the patient. 
Thus, block 6 represents the message sequence of 
trace_authorization() function, which is used to trace 
the history of approved and disapproved events 
2IR of the 
image requestors. In Figure.4, block 7 illustrates revoking 
the permission of
1IR by calling remove_IRs()function, 
which can be executed only by the patient. The details on 
execution of each function are stored in the blockchain as 
an event to help the participants to keep track of their 
transaction details. 
B. PCAC-SC VERIFICATION 
We verify the access sequence and interaction between 
entities by testing two main functions for brevity. We 
choose approve_IRs() for the accept/deny permission to 
access a medical image and traceauthorization()to 
verify access privileges for a given Ethereum address. 
Figure 5 shows that the approved IRs and trace 
authorization functions provide the following test cases: 
request accepted, request denied, authorization success, and 
authorization failed. 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
To test the prototype, we consider the following Ethereum 
address and IPFS hash of the medical image:  
Patient Ethereum address:  
0x5575805E19b4807974Be0B77Fd9d385D4A0e6d1E 
1IR  Ethereum address: 
0xdD870fA1b7C4700F2BD7f44238821C26f7392148 
 Ethereum address: 
0x583031D1113aD414F02576BD6afaBfb302140225 
IPFS hash: 
QmNaS5gQzoPxr3S2n6T6BsFuVRmMFwpohLVFfAFrU8gy
Tq 
 
Testing an approved IRs function 
In this testing, we consider the first case, where a patient 
approves the 1IR address to access medical images by 
mapping with the IPFS hash value. 
Events requestaccepted and approved were triggered 
by approved_IRs() function, and 1IR  gained access 
privileges to a patient medical image. The event is stored 
in the blockchain as shown in Figure. 6. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Access sharing sequence. The blockchain/timeline is shown on the left, pointing with dotted arrows for reference. 
The purple, and red arrows represent interactions between entities. 
FIGURE 5. PCAC-SC validating functions and testing cases. 
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[ 
 { 
  “from”: 
“0xac9d443f875536ce1346e38550857061c019094b”, 
  “topic”: 
“0x8848ffe7bacf0d3c19a311adb625e883f370b9dcbac3438
4bc6240fa4b1461b4”, 
  “event”: “Requestaccepted”, 
  “args”: { 
 “patient”:”0x5575805E19b4807974Be0B77Fd9d3
85D4A0e6d1E”, 
   “info”: “approved by 
patient.”, 
   “length”: 2 
  } 
 }, 
 { 
  “from”: 
“0xac9d443f875536ce1346e38550857061c019094b”, 
  “topic”: 
“0xe3053523a3a35835db28369b20a103b8fe2f7d12c0a6b61
b8c23dfe4d5baed65”, 
  “event”: “Approved”, 
  “args”: { 
   “requester”: 
“0xdD870fA1b7C4700F2BD7f44238821C26f7392148”, 
   “info”: “Authorized to 
access image”, 
   “length”: 2 
  } 
 } 
]  
FIGURE 6. Case 1: event log for approving
1IR address to access a 
patient medical image. 
 
Figure 7 shows the second test case, where a patient 
denies 
2IR  request to access medical images. This function 
triggers two events requestdenied and reason for 
rejecting by the patient. 
[ 
 { 
  "from": 
"0xac9d443f875536ce1346e38550857061c019094b", 
 "topic":"0x75fd1545fc54d42c1c105027968847
e19149f69adb83be50d44a109a72c2fb1b", 
  "event": "Requestdenied", 
  "args": { 
 "patient":"0x5575805E19b4807974Be0B77Fd9d
385D4A0e6d1E", 
   "info": "Failed to be 
approved by patient", 
   "length": 2 
  } 
 }, 
 { 
  "from": 
"0xac9d443f875536ce1346e38550857061c019094b", 
 "topic":"0x560ccc9eee914fbea6dc97d101c07c
4c563f85a3000c838161a83f8fe0405a43", 
  "event": "Reason", 
  "args": { 
   "requester": 
"0x583031D1113aD414F02576BD6afaBfb302140225", 
   "info": " Need more 
detailed information to access my image", 
   "length": 2 
  } 
 } 
] 
FIGURE 7.  Case 2: event log stored in the blockchain for denying 
access to
2IR address. 
Testing trace authorization function 
Here, we test the trace_authorization() function. 
This function is used to prove the ownership and trace 
history of the approved IR’s in the blockchain. To verify 
authorization, let us consider that the
1IR  address is already 
approved. Patient and 
1IR  Ethereum address are given as 
input to execute trace_authorization() function, and 
this triggers authorizationSuccess event. Figure. 8 
shows the event log of the third test case where
1IR  address 
is authorized to access an image by the patient. 
 
[ 
 { 
  “from”: 
“0xac9d443f875536ce1346e38550857061c019094b”, 
  “topic”: 
“0x59b56ffb470a9c0f006904d6c1037d2eeec29ab337e2690
fcdef7e62cf52b1ce”, 
  “event”: “AuthorizationSuccess”, 
  “args”: { 
   “requester”: 
“0xdD870fA1b7C4700F2BD7f44238821C26f7392148”, 
   “info”: “Authorized to 
access image by:”, 
   “patient”: 
“0x5575805E19b4807974Be0B77Fd9d385D4A0e6d1E”, 
   “length”: 3 
  } 
 } 
] 
FIGURE 8. Case 3: event log stored in the blockchain. Information 
shows that the
1IR address was authorized to access a patient medical 
image. 
 
Figure 9 shows the log of authorizationfailed 
event invoked from SC. This event occurs due to the fact 
that the 
1IR  address has been removed or has not been 
approved by the patient. 
 
[ 
 { 
  "from": 
"0xac9d443f875536ce1346e38550857061c019094b", 
  "topic": 
"0x56d9b42fee56a07a830b34605f693fa0593126978262abc
43bcf0f0d62f3b861", 
  "event": "AuthorizationFailed", 
  "args": { 
   "requester": 
"0x583031D1113aD414F02576BD6afaBfb302140225", 
   "info": "Liver image is not 
authorized to access by:", 
   "patient": 
"0x5575805E19b4807974Be0B77Fd9d385D4A0e6d1E", 
   "length": 3 
  } 
 } 
] 
FIGURE 9. Case 4: event log where the
2IR address is not authorized to 
access a patient medical image. 
C. PCIM SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
In the previous sections, we have demonstrated how a 
medical image can be stored and shared in a decentralized 
network using the PCIM system. In this section, we analyze 
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the advantages, cost, and feasibility of the proposed 
framework. 
 
Security and Privacy  
   Under a traditional certificate authority (CA) system 
which is not so trustworthy, impersonated requests can be 
approved due to reckless identity validations, intrusions, or 
government compulsions [25]. In our proposed system, we 
construct public logs for key management, which is 
inherently append-only to enhance the accountability of CA 
operations. The public key validation is performed by the 
trusted participant of the healthcare consortium, i.e., these 
blockchains are accessible only to a privileged group based 
on SC protocol. The validators (trusted participants) follow 
the SC protocols that would limit the image requestor roles 
to effectively prevent any misbehavior in the blockchain. 
The trusted participants are, for example, the patient and the 
radiologist.  In order to access patient’s medical image, the 
requestor must include his/her own public key during the 
execution of request_access() function. This public 
key is signed and verified by the patient using the 
approve_IRs() function. Thus, the requestor is able to 
access the patient original medical images off-chain using 
his/her own private key and prove authorization on-chain 
using trace_authorization() function. The public key 
associated with each blockchain address is public, so 
anyone can verify the digital signature of the transaction in 
the blockchain system. The computational cost of block 
mining prevents attackers from modifying the public key 
logs, after the valid transaction has been accepted by a 
majority of nodes in the healthcare ecosystem. 
   Encryption provides a capability of preventing 
unauthorized users from accessing medical images without 
decryption keys. Furthermore, an IPFS hash value is 
mapped with the approved IRs blockchain address. 
Therefore, approved users have access privileges online and 
can decrypt medical images using their asymmetric private 
keys. 
 
Costs and Practicality 
   For a real-time scenario, there is a huge fluctuation in 
Ether to USD price
9
. For example, in February 2020, one 
Ether had the exchange value of 187 USD. This rate came 
down to 1,100 USD per Ether in January 2018. In our 
proposed system, we define the actual transaction cost to be 
Ether  gas used  gas price.   Here, ‘gas used’ represents 
the constant computational cost. The gas price is adjusted 
by the network [4] to compensate for changes in the value 
of Ether. Thus, the total transaction cost (Ether) is kept 
relatively constant for the accessibility of health care data. 
As for the payer segment, every participant has to pay in 
gas for executing an operation in SC. Thus, the automated 
process of SC would cause significant cost savings for the 
patient. 
                                                 
9  [Online]. Available: https://changelly.com/blog/ethereum-eth-price-
predictions/ 
   In the implemented PCAC-SC prototype, we set a gas 
limit of 30,000, where each unit of gas is set equal to 2 
Gwei. The total transaction fee in this scenario is 0.11 USD. 
Table I summarizes the cost of the executed operations in 
SC. The create_contract() function is implemented 
once with a cost of 0.025 USD. The request_access() 
function cost is 0.093 USD, which is higher than that of 
other functions due to the additional input bytes included 
during the function execution, such as those corresponding 
to the patient blockchain address and notes for the usage 
agreement. The overall costs can be decreased further if the 
size of the input data is minimal. However, these costs are 
still lower than those associated with buying a storage space 
from a third-party service or maintaining a database using a 
centralized system. 
 
TABLE I  
PCAC-SC COST ANALYSIS 
(gasprice = 2 Gwei,1 ether = 187 USD) 
Function Gas Used  Actual Cost(ether) USD 
create_contract() 67394 0.000134788 0.025 
requesting_access() 246908 0.000493816 0.093 
approve_IRs() 170412 0.000340824 0.064 
trace_authorization() 34266 0.000068532 0.013 
remove_IRs() 59358 0.000118716 0.022 
 
Efficient storage of medical images 
The use of IPFS allows constructing a high-throughput 
content-based storage model with content-addressed 
hyperlinks. The benefits of this storage model include the 
following ones: 
1) Content addressing: medical images have a unique 
identifier (cryptographic hash of an image).  
2) Original content: medical images with the same content 
cannot be duplicated and are stored only once. 
3) Tamper proof: an image is verified based on its 
checksum; if the hash changes, IPFS recognizes that an 
image was tampered with. 
4) Archiving: offline data access and immutable data 
storage are useful to get immediate local access to medical 
images even in the cases with a weak healthcare 
infrastructure. 
5) Reduced data scattering: the patient private information 
including diagnosis summary (EHR) is encrypted in 
medical images themselves. Therefore, the data are stored 
in a single node occupying less volume and reducing the 
burden of data management. 
 
Interoperability 
Blockchain technology cryptographically protects the 
state of transactions of medical images. It also protects 
transaction integrity using a digital signature. Image file 
management is transparent, and network peers can verify 
authenticity of the image ownership. 
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Full Control Over Medical Images  
A patient owns a medical image and can monitor it online. 
Patients have the complete transparency over their medical 
images and can provide permission to access or revoke an 
image from being used in clinical trials or for research 
purposes. Consequently, the frauds related to health records 
can be limited. PCAC-SC provides the patients with 
complete flexibility to add or revoke IRs within the system. 
 
Comparison with Existing and Proposed Framework  
   Table II provides the comparison between the proposed 
framework using an ISN [14] and alternative blockchain-
based medical health record management frameworks [24–
26]. From this table, it can be seen that the proposed PCIM 
system has greater advantages comparing with the existing 
alternatives. Among them, studies [14], [18], [19] are based 
on centralized frameworks in which one central node 
failure causes a fail of the whole system. In contrast, in the 
framework proposed in this paper, every node is 
independent of each other, which ensures robust and 
efficient data access. The MedChain [20] uses a  mutable 
P2P storage network, which has a high risk of data attacks 
and content duplication. The proposed PCIM system 
overcomes these disadvantages by using an IPFS-based 
storage in which medical images corresponding to the same 
content are not allowed being duplicated. This allows users 
to have full control of their medical images by ensuring 
guaranteed security, transparency, and data integrity. If the 
contents in a file stored within the IPFS network are not 
peered or active for a period of time, it is recycled by the 
garbage collector. Protocol labs understood this limitation 
of IPFS and build Filecoin as a complementary component, 
that turns cloud storage into an algorithmic market [26]. 
Furthermore, a participant must pin the image content to 
ensure that the content never gets deleted by the garbage 
collector. The image stays up indefinitely, as long as it is 
pinned on the IPFS network. Using the IPFS and 
blockchain system has the advantage of replacing current 
expensive storage systems (PACS) and centralized 
databases and of eliminating the recovery cost in the event 
of data breaches. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The ultimate goal of the proposed system is to demonstrate 
the conceptual and theoretical framework for patient centric 
medical image management based on the Ethereum 
blockchain. This framework was generic and independent 
implementation, i.e., independent of particular medical 
specialties and of local hospitals for the patient benefit. 
However, we note some limitations for a broader concern, 
due to the decentralized nature of our system, such as losing 
private keys. In some studies [27], [28], the researchers 
introduced an efficient recovery mechanism using 
biometric data to create key pairs. This technique helps 
patient to securely store keys on their devices and recover 
the key in case they are lost. Furthermore, the medical 
images are not protected once the sensitive image is 
decrypted. It is difficult to identify the authorized recipients 
who attempt to tamper or manipulate the decrypted medical 
image. To overcome this issue, there are several data hiding 
techniques, i.e., watermarking, reported in the literature 
[29]–[31]. However, these data hiding techniques have not 
yet been clinically employed. In our future work, we will 
address the aforementioned limitations by considering the 
biometric signature [27] and steganography techniques 
[31]. 
   Overall, the practical usefulness of the PCIM system 
depends on the participant experience. Decentralized data 
management is the groundbreaking of blockchain 
development, and it is more of a fascinating prototype of 
what health care technology could look like in the future.  
 
TABLE II 
Comparison between the Existing and Proposed PCIM System
Schemes ISN [14] MedBlock [18] MeDShare [19] MedChain [20] PCIM system 
Source data storage PACS Dedicated servers Cloud server Mutable P2P 
Storage 
Immutable IPFS Storage 
Source data encryption / 
Scheme 
Yes / Not 
mentioned 
Yes / Symmetric 
encryption 
Yes / Not mentioned Yes / Asymmetric 
encryption 
Yes / Asymmetric encryption 
Type of data Medical Images EMR EMR EHR Medical images + Health 
records 
Server attack resistance No No No No Yes 
Tamper-proof database No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Database sharing 
mechanism 
PACS Blockchain Blockchain Blockchain Blockchain 
Database management Centralized Centralized Centralized Semi-centralized Decentralized 
Offline data access Yes No No No Yes 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we presented the POC design of the proposed 
PCIM system: an Ethereum blockchain and IPFS-based 
decentralized framework for storing and sharing medical 
images. Moreover, we introduced a new access 
management system called PCAC-SC that enables 
authorized entities to access the relevant blockchain data. 
The PCIM system facilitates a new way to improve the 
right of patients to perform self-determination regarding 
their medical images. 
   To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first study 
to integrate both the blockchain platform providing the on-
chain access control logs for medical images with smart 
contracts, and the off-chain distributed storage of encrypted 
medical images on the IPFS network. We performed the 
experimental implementation to analyze and evaluate 
rationality and feasibility of the proposed scheme. The 
proposed system facilitates patient access to an immutable 
medical database providing higher efficiency, data 
provenance, and effective audit while sharing medical 
images. The data storage and exchange model is also 
decentralized; therefore, necessity to involve third-party 
intermediaries and administrative structures is eliminated. 
Our future research goal is to deploy the proposed POC 
design in the public blockchain using real-time scenarios to 
form a global PCIM system and to validate the proposed 
approach across a broader set of scenarios. 
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